Nuclear Energy: Between Legitimacy and Threat by Michel, Quentin
Nuclear Energy: Between 
Legitimacy and Threat  
Challenges for a Peaceful World  : An agenda for the 
XXIst century 
Uppsala, Universitetshuset, 11 – 13 of December 2013  
  
Pr. Dr. Quentin Michel 
 Nuclear Energy is … 
Victim of the Original Sin 
First developments of nuclear 
applications were dedicated to the 
elaboration of an explosive device 
WWII : Hiroshima and Nagasaki  
 
Consequence: nuclear energy was first 
considered as military technology 
rather than an energy with potential 
peaceful applications 
 
   1946 : US imposes a trade 
prohibition on all nuclear 
technologies 
Adoption in July 1946 
of the Atomic Energy 
Act (McMahon Act) 
establishing a 
program to restrict the 
dissemination of 
information inside and 
outside the country 
 
Motivation  
If potential peaceful applications of 
nuclear physics could be developed, it 
could not be split from military one 
Nevertheless  
-  Development of nuclear weapons by Soviet 
Union without US technology  
-  Development of nuclear peaceful 
application raise important economic 
expectations  
Soviet Union was developed peaceful 
application and was ready to share it  
-  Conditions of supply required to end users 
interesting in developing civil nuclear 
programs  by certain European States were 
less constraining than the one imposed by US 
industries. 
  Production of isotopes for medical use 
 
1953: US reverses its 
policy 
Principle : Development of peaceful 
application of nuclear energy and 
international exchange of nuclear 
technologies are possible IF and ONLY 
fissile materials produced or transferred 
are under adequate safeguards  
Atoms for Peace Plan presented by the 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 
December 1953: 
Open access to (US) peaceful nuclear 
applications conditioned upon the 
submission by the end-user of adequate 
safeguards, that shall be assumed by the 
supplier State or by an international 
organisation 
 Creation of International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) and its 
safeguards system   
Establishment  of a multilateral export control 
regime was suggested to NATO members : 
COCOM 
Main objective : avoiding the transfer of the US 
technologies directly or indirectly to a Warsaw 
Pact Members or another sensitive countries, 
such as China 
- Informal prohibition exports of sensitive 
items, mostly military related ones, to 
non-allied countries 
- Derogation would have to be authorised 
by consensus of all participating States 
 
Opening nuclear trade for 
selected countries 
The impossible challenge to 
balance economic interest, 
political interests  and non 
proliferation concerns 
1968 TNP : formal acknowledgment for 
certain States to legally detain nuclear 
weapons against inalienable right for all 
participating state to have access and 
develop nuclear peaceful activities 
Two commitments to be implemented by 
the NPT Supplier States : 
1. To control the transfers to NNWS of an 
undefined list of items 
2. To submit the export of nuclear items to 
the condition that on all source or special 
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear 
activities within the territory of end user 







But allowing nuclear trade 
involves competition between 
potential suppliers … 
To clarify NPT commitments and to avoid 
unfair competition a group of suppliers 
states (NSG) has adopted common 
guidelines: 
-  Defining a list of materials, equipments 
and technologies 
-  Determined that the IAEA safeguards 
required by Article III of the NPT are those 
defined by the INFCIRC/153 also called 
Comprehensive Safeguards 
-  Common criteria and conditions to 
authorise the export 
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Nuclear suppliers group guidelines 
-  Soft law instrument 
Politically binding instrument  
-  Non universal 
Only nuclear and nuclear 
potential suppliers could be 
member of the group  
-  Require  adoption of national 
implementing provisions 
Risk of inconsistency 
What are the challenges for 
XXIst century ? 
-  New nuclear weapon States since 
entry into force of NPT :   
North Korea, Pakistan, India, Israel  
-  New States of concerns 
Iran 
-  Lack of coherence in the nuclear 
trade policy among suppliers  
Indian exception 
1. Nuclear weapons 
proliferation didn’t stop 
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- India :  non-NPT nuclear weapon State 
Not member of export control regimes 
- NPT State essential commitment : 
Prohibition to export nuclear items to 
a nuclear weapon State not Party to 
the Treaty 
-  No exception authorized by the Treaty 
 
Therefore exporting nuclear items to India 
is in contradiction with international legally 
binding commitment 
The Indian exception 
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2008 a exception has been adopted 
by the NSG authorising States 
members to export all nuclear and 
nuclear-related items to India  
Restricted to peaceful 
applications and not only for 
safety 
When softlaw lifts a legally 
binding prohibition   
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NSG lack of coherence of export 
control policy has been raised by 
-  Pakistan requesting a similar status 
-  Iran considering that suppliers 
reward a real proliferator and 
impeach an NPT State to use its right 
to access to peaceful applications 
US, Russia, UK, Germany, China, 
France and other main suppliers 
have ratified the NPT and are NSG 
States Parties   
  
 
-  Multilateral export control regimes have been 
focusing essentially on export transactions  
-  Proliferation scheme has become complex and 
involves an network of actors and operations 
Brokering, transit, financing, shipping, 
importing 
-  New proliferation concerns raised by Non-State 
Actors : nuclear and radiological  
Terrorism  and dirty bomb  
 
Require fundamental review of existing nuclear 
trade control regimes  
2. From export control to 
trade control 
Slow merging of nuclear trade control principles with 
other WMD non-proliferation principles 
-  Development of the dual-use items concept(s)  
Peaceful and non-peaceful, nuclear and non-
nuclear, civilian and military, conventional and 
WMD 
Telecommunication interception, internet 
monitoring equipment, mass-surveillance, 
monitoring and violation of human rights  
-  Reversing/sharing the non-proliferation responsibility 
from public authorities to economic operators 
Catch-all clause provisions 
3. From nuclear trade control 
to WMD trade control 
-  Efficiency of trade control system relays 
on customs verifications  
Possibility to control the conformity of 
custom declaration with the content of 
the container  
-  Proliferators attempt to acquire items but 
also technologies 
4. From tangible transfers to 
intangible transfers  
-  Technology transfers could be done voluntary 
or involuntary  via intangible means of transfers 
Transfers via emails, uploading or 
downloading from webserver,, intranet 
exchanges, cloud computing… 
-  Almost impossible for Customs to control 
Needs of specific risk assessment tools  
-  New technology development increases the 
trend  
3D printer and possibility of manufacturing 
process monitor from a third location 

